Two Very Serious Catholic And Muslim Essays.

Note: This posting is very long and consists of two very serious essays on Theology and the relations between Christianity and Islam. It is recommended for readers who are able to handle ideas at this level.




The Church and Islam: A Sprig of Dialogue Has Sprouted in Regensburg
After the storm, the Muslim world is also producing signs of discussion “according to reason.” An erudite question-and-answer between the Catholic Martinetti and Muslim theologian Aref Ali Nayed. And cardinal Bertone writes...

by Sandro Magister





ROMA, October 30, 2006 – The Regensburg effect shows new developments every day. After the storm that followed the “lectio” by Benedict XVI on September 12, the Muslim world is producing more and more measured, reasoned replies to the pope’s arguments.

The “open letter” to the pope from 38 Muslim leaders and scholars – prominently featured by this website – is so far the most striking sign of this new attention on the part of the Muslim world.

But both before and after this letter, there have been other significant contributions.

The first in-depth analysis of Benedict VXI’s lecture in Regensburg on the part of a Muslim theologian was published on this website on October 4. The author, Aref Ali Nayed, born in Libya, is currently the managing director of a technology company headquartered in the United Arab Emirates. He studied hermeneutics and the philosophy of science in the United States and Canada, has taken courses at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, and has given lectures at the Pontifical Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies. He is a consultant for the Interfaith Program of the University of Cambridge. He is a devout Sunni Muslim, and describes himself as a “theologian of the Asharite school, Maliki in jurisprudential tendency, and Shadhili-Rifai in spiritual leanings.”

But the commentary by Aref Ali Nayed, which was later published in its complete form on an English Islamic website, didn’t end there.

Some of the passages of Aref Ali Nayed’s exposition received a reply from an Italian Catholic scholar who is an expert in medieval philosophy and theology, Alessandro Martinetti, from Ghemme in the province of Novara. Martinetti insisted in particular upon the relationship between God and reason, and on the radical difference in this relationship as seen by Islam and by Catholic doctrine.

Martinetti’s note – which was previewed for Italian readers in the blog “Settimo Cielo [Seventh Heaven]” – is presented in its entirety further down on this page.

Aref Ali Nayed, in turn, replied to Martinetti’s theses. And this extensive reply is also presented in its entirety on this page, in its original English version. Aref Ali Nayed’s counter-thesis is that it is wrong to oppose a “God-as-pure will” in Islam against a “God-as-Logos” in Christianity. In his view, the theology of Thomas Aquinas himself on the relationship between God and reason “is very close to Ibn Hazm and Asha’rite Muslim theologians.”

But before the erudite dispute between Martinetti and Aref Ali Nayed, in their comments on Benedict XVI’s lecture in Regensburg, another text is presented on this page, one that is quasi-unpublished, written by the Vatican secretary of state, cardinal Tarcisio Bertone.

It is quasi-unpublished because it was by cardinal Bertone for the next issue, not yet printed, of the Catholic magazine “30 Days,” directed by Giulio Andreotti, who was the head of the Italian government and its foreign minister a number of times, and is very close to Vatican diplomatic circles.

Bertone’s text written for “30 Days” will serve as the introduction to this same magazine’s reprinting of Benedict XVI’s lecture in Regensburg.

The complete text by Bertone is available now on the website of “30 Days.” What is included below is the last part of it.

There are passages in this that deserve attention.

The cardinal secretary of state announces a reinforcement of the activities of the apostolic nunciatures in Muslim countries, and a more systematic use of the Arabic language by the Vatican.

It expresses hope for increased “dialogue with the thinking [Muslim] élites, with the confidence of reaching the masses after this, of changing mentalities and educating consciences.”

As for the terrain of possible agreement between Christianity and Islam, Bertone identifies this in the “promotion of the dignity of every person” and in “education toward the understanding and protection of human rights.” But this does not mean that the Church would renounce “proposing and proclaiming the Gospel, and among Muslims as well, in the ways and forms most respectful toward the freedom of the act of faith.”

So here follow, in order:

– the text by cardinal Bertone,
– the reply from Alessandro Martinetti to Aref Ali Nayed’s commentary on the lecture by Benedict XVI in Regensburg,
– the counter-reply from Aref Ali Nayed to Martinetti’s observations.


1. Dialoguing with the thinking élites in order to reach the masses

by Tarcisio Bertone


[...] Christianity is certainly not limited to the West, nor is it identified with it, but it is only by reestablishing a dynamic and creative relationship with its own Christian history that democracy and Western civilization will be able to recover their impulse and momentum, or the moral energy necessary to confront a strongly competitive international scene.

There must be a rooting out of the anti-Islamic rancor that lurks in many hearts, in spite of the fact that this endangers the lives of many Christians.

Moreover, the strong condemnation of the forms of mockery toward religion – and here I refer, in part, to the episode of the irreverent satirical cartoons that inflamed Muslim crowds at the beginning of this year – is an indispensable precondition for condemning the exploitation of this mockery.

But the deep issue is not even that of respect for religious symbols. This issue is simple, and radical: the human dignity of the Muslim believer must be safeguarded. In a debate related to these topics, a young Muslim born in Italy simply asserted: “For us, the Prophet is not God, but we love him very much.” There must at least be respect for this profound sentiment!

In the face of Muslim believers, but also in the face of terrorists, the criterion that should dictate behavior is not usefulness or harm, but human dignity.

The crucial prelude for the relationship between the Church and Islam is, therefore, the promotion of the dignity of every person and education toward the understanding and protection of human rights.

In the second place, and in connection with this precondition, we must not cease to propose and proclaim the Gospel, and among Muslims as well, in the ways and forms most respectful toward the freedom of the act of faith.

To reach these objectives, the Holy See is considering how to get the maximum leverage out of its apostolic nunciatures in Muslim-majority countries, in order to increase the understanding – and also, if possible, the sharing – of the Holy See’s positions.

I am thinking also of an eventual strengthening of relations with the Arab League, which is headquartered in Egypt, while keeping in mind the competencies of this international body.

The Holy See is also considering the establishment of cultural relations between Catholic universities and universities in Arab countries, and among men and women of culture. Dialogue is possible among them, and I would even say it is productive. I recall a few international conferences on interdisciplinary topics that we held at the Pontifical Lateran University, for example on human rights, justice, and the economy.

We must continue along this road and intensify our dialogue with the thinking élites, with the confidence of reaching the masses after this, of changing mentalities and educating consciences.

And precisely in order to facilitate this dialogue, the Holy See has begun, and will continue, a more systematic use of the Arabic language in its system of communications.

All this will always take into account that the safeguarding of that icon – poor and constantly threatened, but supremely loved by God – that is the human person, who is loved for his own sake, as Vatican Council II says, is the greatest witness that the biblical religious traditions can offer to the world.

__________


2. Unbridled will or Logos? The God of Islam and the Christian God

by Alessandro Martinetti


The commentary by Aref Ali Nayed on Benedict XVI’s “lectio” in Regensburg is stimulating some reflection, in particular on the relationship between God and reason.

Nayed writes:

“Reason as a gift from God can never be above God. That is the whole point of Ibn Hazm; a point that was paraphrased in such a mutilated way by Benedict XVI’s learned sources. Ibn Hazm, like the Asharite theologians with whom he often contended, did insist upon God’s absolute freedom to act. However, Ibn Hazm did recognize, like most other Muslim theologians that God freely chooses, in His compassion towards His creatures, to self-consistently act reasonably so that we can use our reason to align ourselves with His guidance and directive.

“Ibn Hazm, like most other Muslim theologians, did hold that God is not externally-bound by anything, including reason. However, at no point does Ibn Hazm claim that God does not freely self-commit Himself and honors such commitments Such divine free-self-committing is Qur’anically propounded 'kataba rabukum ala nafsihi al-Rahma' (Your Lord has committed Himself to compassion). Reason need not be above God, and externally normative to Him. It can be a grace of God that is normative because of God’s own free commitment to acting consistently with it.

“A person who believes the last proposition need not be an irrational or un-reasonable human-being, with an irrational or whimsical God! The contrast between Christianity and Islam on this basis is not only unfair, but also quite questionable.

“Granted that the Pontiff is striving to convince a secular university that theology has a place in that reason-based setting. However, this should not go so far as to make God subject to an externally-binding reason. Most major Christian theologians, even the reason-loving [Thomas] Aquinas never put reason above God."

In Nayed’s view, then, saint Thomas “never put reason above God.” But not placing reason above God is not the same thing as asserting, as Nayed does, that “God is not externally bound by anything, including reason,” and that reason “can be a grace of God that is normative because of God’s own free commitment to acting consistently with it.”

Saint Thomas would never have subscribed to these assertions; on the contrary, he vigorously opposed them. And together with him, the Catholic magisterium does not agree with them, but disputes them. It thus rejects the depiction of a God who “freely chooses, in his compassion towards his creatures, to act reasonably in consistency with himself so that we can use our reason to align ourselves with His guidance and directives.”

If asserting that reason is not normative for God, and that God is consistent with himself only out of a supremely free decision and is not externally bound to reason; if this is the same as asserting – as it seems to me that Nayed does – that God could exist and act in disdain of reason if only he wished to do so by an act of supreme and limitless freedom, then it is opportune to clarify that Thomas, and with him the Catholic magisterium, rejects this conviction, glimpsing in this an irrational voluntarism incompatible with right reason and with the Catholic faith, as the pope himself remarks in his “lectio” in Regensburg:

“In all honesty, one must observe that in the late Middle Ages we find trends in theology which would sunder this synthesis between the Greek spirit and the Christian spirit. In contrast with the so-called intellectualism of Augustine and Thomas, there arose with Duns Scotus a voluntarism which ultimately led to the claim that we can only know God’s 'voluntas ordinata.' Beyond this is the realm of God’s freedom, in virtue of which he could have done the opposite of everything he has actually done. This gives rise to positions which clearly approach those of Ibn Hazn and might even lead to the image of a capricious God, who is not even bound to truth and goodness. God’s transcendence and otherness are so exalted that our reason, our sense of the true and good, are no longer an authentic mirror of God, whose deepest possibilities remain eternally unattainable and hidden behind his actual decisions.”

Here Ratzinger is not speaking as an engaged theologian – as many have maintained – in illustrating reckless and audacious theological positions that may be as authoritative as one pleases, but are nevertheless personal; it is, rather, pope Benedict XVI, who judiciously does nothing but restate the consolidated positions of Catholic doctrine, which are enunciated in terms identical to those of John Paul II in the encyclical “Fides et Ratio” in 1998. This text proclaims the universal value of certain rationally knowable and applicable principles, including the principle of non-contradiction: this is a principle that is universal – transcendental, as the philosophers would say – precisely because not even God can violate it:

“Although times change and knowledge increases, it is possible to discern a core of philosophical insight within the history of thought as a whole. Consider, for example, the principles of non-contradiction, finality and causality, as well as the concept of the person as a free and intelligent subject, with the capacity to know God, truth and goodness. Consider as well certain fundamental moral norms which are shared by all. These are among the indications that, beyond different schools of thought, there exists a body of knowledge which may be judged a kind of spiritual heritage of humanity. It is as if we had come upon an implicit philosophy, as a result of which all feel that they possess these principles, albeit in a general and unreflective way. Precisely because it is shared in some measure by all, this knowledge should serve as a kind of reference-point for the different philosophical schools. Once reason successfully intuits and formulates the first universal principles of being and correctly draws from them conclusions which are coherent both logically and ethically, then it may be called right reason or, as the ancients called it, orthós logos, recta ratio” (“Fides et Ratio”, 4).

No less clear and eloquent is this passage from the dogmatic constitution on the Catholic faith from Vatican Council I, “Dei Filius” (IV, DS 3017), cited with clear approval in “Fides et Ratio” in paragraph 53:

“Even if faith is superior to reason there can never be a true divergence between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals the mysteries and bestows the gift of faith has also placed in the human spirit the light of reason. This God could not deny himself, nor could the truth ever contradict the truth”.

The magisterium therefore teaches that God cannot exercise his own freedom in a contradictory way; that is, totally disconnected from the principles of reason: he does not submit himself to these by an arbitrary decree, but because he himself is the non-contradictory foundation of everything that exists. A God who could violate the principle of non-contradiction – such as being, when and if he wishes, indifferently both love and its lack, a merciful creator and a sadistic and brutal butcher, who issues a commandment and can then punish and damn at his discretion those obey his command – this God would be an incomprehensible sphinx, fickle and potentially an enemy of man. He would be a dangerous, omnipotent autocrat who, as the pope stressed in Regensburg, “is not bound even by his own word,” because “nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God's will, we would even have to practise idolatry.”

The God proclaimed by the Catholic Church is, on the other hand – and can be no other way – always and exclusively good, the giver of life and love; redeemer and savior, and never a persecutor; creator, and not a destroyer. He does not take pleasure from suffering or sin, but he can do nothing but place his creatures in the situation in which they can achieve their highest good. He is faithful and consistent – and cannot help but be so – in spite of the infidelity and inconsistency of human beings in the wearisome journey of individual existence and of history. He can not be like this, because “God cannot contravene himself, nor can truth contradict truth.” God cannot be infinite love and also, contradictorily, a limited love that is fickle, intermittent, and opportunistic.

I am not overlooking the fact that much theology, including some found in Catholic circles, is afraid of a God who could not ignore the principle of non-contradiction, positing that a God who could not get around this principle would not be omnipotent, and could not exercise his own love in a supremely free manner. But it is clear what the risks are if the magisterium would adopt the image of a God supremely free to act against reason. It is time to overcome the dead and sterile opposition between a God-Logos who by adhering to the principle of non-contradiction closes himself up in an unassailable rationalistic detachment impermeable to love, and a God-Love, who can at will violate rational principles simply to reinforce his own nature of free love in an absolute and omnipotent manner.

As Benedict XVI teaches in Regensburg, “Not to act with 'logos' is contrary to God’s nature. [...] God does not become more divine when we push him away from us in a sheer, impenetrable voluntarism; rather, the truly divine God is the God who has revealed himself as 'logos' and, as 'logos,' has acted and continues to act lovingly on our behalf. Certainly, love 'transcends' knowledge and is thereby capable of perceiving more than thought alone (cf. Eph 3:19); nonetheless it continues to be love of the God who is 'logos.' Consequently, Christian worship is 'spiritual' worship in harmony with the eternal Word and with our reason (cf. Rom 12:1).” In short: God is love – Deus caritas est! – precisely in that he is Logos, and he is Logos precisely in that he is love.

Such is the God of the Catholic Church. So it does not seem to me that the Church can agree with Nayed when he asserts that “the contrast between Christianity and Islam on this basis is not only unfair, but also quite questionable.”

If the image of God in Islam as conveyed by Nayed is correct – and I do not intend to address this question, nor to hazard myself in dangerous exercises of Qur’anic exegesis – if, that is “God freely chooses, in his compassion towards his creatures, to act reasonably in consistency with himself,” and if “reason need not be above God, and externally normative to Him. It can be a grace of God that is normative because of God’s own free commitment to acting consistently with it,” then it must be distinctly emphasized that this image of God clashes with the one proclaimed as genuine by the Catholic Church, as the pope theologian clearly explained in Regensburg.

__________


3. Our God and Your God is One

by Aref Ali Nayed


In response to my commentary on the Lecture of Benedict XVI, Alessandro Martinetti wrote a series of comments under the title: “Will or Logos? The God of Islam and the God of Christianity [Arbitrio o Logos? Il Dio dell’islam e quello cristiano]”. The following notes and extensive quotations constitute a response to some of the important points made by Martinetti.

In developing my notes, and in the hope of achieving mutual understanding, I shall invoke only such sources and arguments that would be deemed authoritative or normative by the Catholic Martinetti. I will strive to show that Martinetti’s own Catholic tradition supports, rather than opposes, a position similar to that of Ibn Hazm and other Muslim theologians as briefly outlined in my commentary.

Starting from the Qur’anic injunction to discuss matters with the people of the Book in the best possible way, and with the Prophetic injunction to speak to people in modes suitable for their ways of reasoning, I shall not appeal, in these notes, to the Qur’an, the Sunnah, or the Islamic tradition, but to Martinetti’s own Christian and philosophic tradition. In my notes I shall strive towards the Qur’anically sought after “common discourse” (kalimatun sawa): common recognition of the One True God.

My guide in these notes is the following Qur’anic aya (29:46):

“Do not argue with the People of the Book but in the best of ways, except with those who have been unjust, and say: ‘we believe in what has been revealed to us, and what has been revealed to you, our God and your God is One, and we are devoted to Him’.”

Of course, my own Asha’rite position is rooted in God’s revelation in the Qur’an and the Sunnah as understood and expounded by the Sunni scholars of the Asha’rite school.

Martinetti’s main strategy is that of undermining my claim that it is unfair and questionable to contrast a purported rational God of Christianity with a purported irrational and whimsical God of Islam.

Martinetti, as is suggested by the title of his comments, counter-claims that the “God of Christianity” contrasts with the “God of Islam”. The God of Christianity is supposedly a “God of logos”, and the God of Islam is supposedly a “God of will”. The aim of my notes is to collapse this false distinction, using Martinetti’s own traditional sources, and to show that his contrast between two different Gods, a rational and a whimsical one, reaffirms yet another polarity in the dubious ‘contrast tables’ discredited in my commentary.

Martinetti basically uses passages in which I tried to briefly make sense of Ibn Hazm’s position, in order to prove that I am putting forth an irrational whimsical God, which he then contrasts with his rational God.

Martinetti is also keen to undermine my claim that the Catholic tradition itself, and especially Thomas Aquinas, does not support the elevation of Reason above God.

He counter-claims that God can not but respect and act according to the rules of Reason, including the “principle of non-contradiction”. Martinetti believes that Aquinas, the Catholic tradition (he especially cites “Fides et Ratio”), and Benedict XVI, all share that counter-claim.

My strategy in these notes consists in two moves:

– strive to show Martinetti that Catholic normative doctrines and documents clearly state that the God of the Muslims and that of the Christians is the very same God, and that his false contrast between “our God” and “your God” is not only unfair, but constitutes a rejection of authoritative (for him) Catholic teachings in this regard;

– strive to show Martinetti that Thomas Aquinas, based on Biblical grounds, does not elevate Reason above God, and that he, to the contrary, holds views that are very close to Ibn Hazm and Asha’rite Muslim theologians. “Fides et Ratio” can also be shown to be in a continuous line with a more accurate reading of Aquinas and close to Asha’rite teachings on Faith and Reason.

It is hoped that my notes will make clear to Martinetti that there is no need to appeal to a normative transcendental Reason, above God, for Muslims to be rational, or for our God to be considered rational. It is hoped that Martinetti will ultimately see that our God is One!


Move I: Catholic normative teachings regarding the worship of the One God in Islam and Christianity


Martinetti, by taking “Fides et Ratio” as authoritative, signals that he is a devout Catholic who should equally uphold, as Pope John Paul II always did, and as Pope Benedict XVI still does, the teachings of the Second Vatican Council (underlining added for emphasis):

“Nostra Aetate”:

“The Church regards with esteem also the Moslems. They adore the one God, living and subsisting in Himself; merciful and all-powerful, the Creator of heaven and earth, who has spoken to men; they take pains to submit wholeheartedly to even His inscrutable decrees, just as Abraham, with whom the faith of Islam takes pleasure in linking itself, submitted to God. Though they do not acknowledge Jesus as God, they revere Him as a prophet. They also honor Mary, His virgin Mother; at times they even call on her with devotion. In addition, they await the day of judgment when God will render their deserts to all those who have been raised up from the dead. Finally, they value the moral life and worship God especially through prayer, almsgiving and fasting”. (1)

The reaffirmations and clarifications of “Nostra Aetate” by Pope John Paul II:

“Christians and Muslims, we have many things in common, as believers and as human beings. We live in the same world, marked by many signs of hope, but also by multiple signs of anguish. For us, Abraham is a very model of faith in God, of submission to his will and of confidence in his goodness. We believe in the same God, the one God, the living God, the God who created the world and brings his creatures to their perfection”. (2)

“As I have often said in other meetings with Muslims, your God and ours is one and the same, and we are brothers and sisters in the faith of Abraham. Thus it is natural that we have much to discuss concerning true holiness in obedience and worship to God.” (3)

“On other occasions I have spoken of the religious patrimony of Islam and of its spiritual values. The Catholic Church realizes that the element of worship given to the one, living, subsistent, merciful and almighty Creator of heaven and earth is common to Islam and herself, and that it is a great link uniting all Christians and Muslims. With great satisfaction she also notes, among other elements of Islam which are held in common, the honour attributed to Jesus Christ and his Virgin Mother”. (4)

The recent reaffirmations of “Nostra Aetate” by Pope Benedict XVI:

“The position of the Pope concerning Islam is unequivocally that expressed by the conciliar document ‘Nostra Aetate’”. (5)

Martinetti’s contrast between the God of Christianity and the God of Islam is in direct violation of the teachings of the last and most authoritative Vatican Council. Given his obvious devotion to Catholic doctrine, Martinetti must reconsider his position.

The Qur’an teaches Muslims to invite the People of the Book (Jews and Christians) to come to a common discourse and to affirm the worship of the One True God. Vatican II teaches Catholics to come to such a common discourse. It is sad to see a Catholic wanting to lapse to pre-Vatican II positions that were not conducive to mutual respect or co-living.


Move II: Thomas Aquinas is not on the side of Martinetti!


Martinetti, without any documentation, claims that Aquinas would never concur with a position similar to the one I attributed to Ibn Hazm. While, I am no Thomist, I dare bring the attention of Martinetti to the following facts.


1. Aquinas affirms, just as most Muslim theologians do, that it is Revelation that is the ultimate and real teacher about God and His ways. Reason must strive to understand, but it is Revelation that saves:


“It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: ‘The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee’ (Isaiah 66:4). But the end must first be known by men who are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation”. (6)


2. Aquinas affirms, just as most Muslim theologians do, that God is omnipotent and that His Power and Will are utterly efficacious:


“God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just”.

“Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them another order”.


3. Aquinas points out the common mistake of subjecting divine acts to natural necessity:


“In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place – as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His justice consists, as said above, is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done”.


4. Aquinas explains why this mistake is often made:


“In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect”.


5. Aquinas does teach that objects that are impossible by their very definition can not be done, but that we should still not say that God can not do them:


“Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being is numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: ‘No word shall be impossible with God’. For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing”. (7)

It is noteworthy that Muslim Asha’rite theologians, including Asha’ri himself, upheld a very similar doctrine to that outlined by Aquinas in this regard. The way to avoid what is often called the “paradox of omnipotence” is to hold that things like “unmovable stones”, “squared circles” and “Euclidean triangles with angles adding up to more that 180 degrees” simply can not be. Thus, the question of whether or not an omnipotent God can make them should not even arise. God does not make such things not because of an externally imposed normative “law of non-contradiction” to which he must abide, but simply because such things, by definition, can not be. They do not have what it takes to be not because of a logical contradiction, but because of an ontological failure to be.

Many classical Muslim theologians who argued against the sensibility of the Christian doctrine of trinity used logic very similar to that of Aquinas, but added that the notion of the trinity itself “implies being and non-being at the same time [and] is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence”. “For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing”. For many classical Muslim theologians, the idea of a “Man-God” was taken to be of the same category as the idea of a “squared circle”. Such ideas, as the phenomenologist Meinong rightly points out, can “subsist” and be referred to, talked about, and even believed in, but can not possibly “exist”.

Of course, despite the authority of Aquinas on things reasonable and logical, Aquinas himself, and the Catholic Church, throughout its history had to preserve a space for ultra-logics that do not fit neatly into the categories of human logics. That is the only way to preserve the authoritative (for them) teachings of Paul and other Christian sages on a “Wisdom of God” that transcends the “Wisdom of the World”. The appeal to such “extra-rationality” is very clear in the authoritative teachings of the Catholic Church. “Fides et Ratio” itself has many passages defending precisely such a position not on the basis of “Reason” but on the basis of “Revelation”.


6. “Fides et Ratio”, just as most Muslim theologians do, reaffirms the normativity of Revelation over Reason:


“Restating almost to the letter the teaching of the First Vatican Council's constitution ‘Dei Filius’, and taking into account the principles set out by the Council of Trent, the Second Vatican Council's constitution ‘Dei Verbum’ pursued the age-old journey of understanding faith, reflecting on Revelation in the light of the teaching of Scripture and of the entire Patristic tradition. At the First Vatican Council, the Fathers had stressed the supernatural character of God's Revelation. On the basis of mistaken and very widespread assertions, the rationalist critique of the time attacked faith and denied the possibility of any knowledge which was not the fruit of reason's natural capacities. This obliged the Council to reaffirm emphatically that there exists a knowledge which is peculiar to faith, surpassing the knowledge proper to human reason, which nevertheless by its nature can discover the Creator. This knowledge expresses a truth based upon the very fact of God who reveals himself, a truth which is most certain, since God neither deceives nor wishes to deceive”. (8)


7. “Fides et Ratio” reaffirms that divine Will can overcome human “habitual patterns of thought”, and that it is not bound by human logic and systems:


“This is why the Christian's relationship to philosophy requires thorough-going discernment. In the New Testament, especially in the Letters of Saint Paul, one thing emerges with great clarity: the opposition between ‘the wisdom of this world’ and the wisdom of God revealed in Jesus Christ. The depth of revealed wisdom disrupts the cycle of our habitual patterns of thought, which are in no way able to express that wisdom in its fullness.

“The beginning of the First Letter to the Corinthians poses the dilemma in a radical way. The crucified Son of God is the historic event upon which every attempt of the mind to construct an adequate explanation of the meaning of existence upon merely human argumentation comes to grief. The true key-point, which challenges every philosophy, is Jesus Christ's death on the Cross. It is here that every attempt to reduce the Father's saving plan to purely human logic is doomed to failure. ‘Where is the one who is wise? Where is the learned? Where is the debater of this age? Has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?’ (1 Corinthians 1:20), the Apostle asks emphatically. The wisdom of the wise is no longer enough for what God wants to accomplish; what is required is a decisive step towards welcoming something radically new: ‘God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise...; God chose what is low and despised in the world, things that are not to reduce to nothing things that are’ (1 Corinthians 1:27-28). Human wisdom refuses to see in its own weakness the possibility of its strength; yet Saint Paul is quick to affirm: ‘When I am weak, then I am strong’ (2 Corinthians 12:10). Man cannot grasp how death could be the source of life and love; yet to reveal the mystery of his saving plan God has chosen precisely that which reason considers ‘foolishness’ and a ‘scandal’.

“The wisdom of the Cross, therefore, breaks free of all cultural limitations which seek to contain it and insists upon an openness to the universality of the truth which it bears. What a challenge this is to our reason, and how great the gain for reason if it yields to this wisdom! Of itself, philosophy is able to recognize the human being's ceaselessly self-transcendent orientation towards the truth; and, with the assistance of faith, it is capable of accepting the ‘foolishness’ of the Cross as the authentic critique of those who delude themselves that they possess the truth, when in fact they run it aground on the shoals of a system of their own devising”. (9)

Of course, based on what we take to be God’s own and final Qur’anic revelation of the truth regarding Jesus (peace be upon him), we Muslims accept God’s judgment that it is not “befitting” to God to have a son or become human. Thus most Muslim theologians deny the doctrines of the incarnation and crucifixion not only on the basis of the philosophical logic concerning impossible objects (as briefly outlined above), but on the basis of divine revelation (or revealed divine logic) that Muslims solemnly hold authentic and true.

Despite the fact that a Muslim, based on the ultimate revelatory authority he or she accepts, must reject the contents of the particular example claimed by “Fides et Ratio” to be a willful rupture of the rules of human reason, the example itself does establish that Catholicism, like Islam, does elevate the freedom and will of God over any limits on them by any external human or transcendental “Reason”. Does that make Catholic teaching irrational, or the Catholic God an irrational God?

One person’s extra-rationality is often another person’s irrationality! It all depends on one’s ultimate criterion. For us Muslims that ultimate criterion (al-furqan) on the doctrine of God, is the Qur’an and the Sunnah. It is pointless, however, for Christians and Muslims to exchange accusations of irrationality based on their contrasting communal experiences of what they take to be extra-rational ruptures of the divine into history. Such a mutually-destructive polemical exchange will only satisfy atheistic secularists who think that religiosity as such is fundamentally irrational. Muslim and Christians must cooperate in staking a place for the extra-rational in a world increasingly dominated by a godless secularist outlook. As pointed out in the beginning of my commentary, Benedict XVI’s just call for an expansion of the notion of Reason so as to accommodate revelatory insights is something that both Christians and Muslims can positively respond to.

Furthermore, having different authoritative revelatory criteria for the doctrine of God does not necessarily mean that we have different Gods. Here it is useful to invoke the important distinction, made by the logician Frege, between “sense” and “reference”. In talking of God, He is our common “reference”, and we are all referring to the very same God. However, in talking of God, we, of course, have different “senses” or ways of understanding and referring to Him (senses and ways that are deeply rooted in our different revelatory traditions and communal experiences).

Perhaps this distinction can help Martinetti see that its is possible for a Muslim and a Christian to worship and talk about the same God, while at the same time solemnly upholding different, and even opposing, senses of Him.

In some areas, as in the upholding of the sovereign Will of God, it is possible for Muslim and Christian theological senses to come very close to each other, in addition to sharing the same reference. In other areas, as in Trinitarian versus Unitarian doctrines, Christian and Muslim theological senses are in clear opposition. Despite such opposition, we must not fall into the temptation of scoffing at, or dismissing, each other. We must, together, keep our hearts and minds focused on Him who is our common reference, and continue to engage each other in a pray-full, reasoned, and peaceful dialectical discussion.

Part of the task of inter-religious dialogue is to invoke the unity of reference in order to make room for the exploration of the diversity of senses. Such exploration can enhance our understandings of the different, and even oppositional senses, we have of the divine. Our own different senses of the divine become clearer as we engage each other in sincere and devout discussion regarding the One God. This is why I am so grateful for Martinetti’s comments. I sincerely hope our discussion will continue.


8. The biblical basis for the affirmation of the sovereignty of the will of God


The above teachings of the Catholic Church regarding the will of God are not at all surprising. The Bible, in both the Old Testament and the New Testament, is full of repeated affirmations of the total sovereignty of the will of God. The following passage of Paul (Romans 9:14-26) suffices as an illustration:

“What shall we say then? Is there unrighteousness with God? May it never be! For he said to Moses: ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion’. So then it is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who has mercy. For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, ‘For this very purpose I caused you to be raised up, that I might show in you my power, and that my name might be proclaimed in all the earth’. So then, he has mercy on whom he desires, and he hardens whom he desires. You will say then to me, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who withstands his will?’ But indeed, O man, who are you to reply against God? Will the thing formed ask him who formed it: ‘Why did you make me like this?’ Or hasn't the potter a right over the clay, from the same lump to make one part a vessel for honor, and another for dishonor? What if God, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much patience vessels of wrath made for destruction, and that he might make known the riches of his glory on vessels of mercy, which he prepared beforehand for glory, us, whom he also called, not from the Jews only, but also from the Gentiles? As he says also in Hosea: ‘I will call them my people, which were not my people; and her beloved, who was not beloved. It will be that in the place where it was said to them, 'You are not my people,' there they will be called children of the living God’.”

It is a simple fact that the God of the Bible, just as the God of the Qur’an, cannot be made to fit within the bounds and designs of the human logics of the philosophers (not even within the great logic of Aristotle so revered in both of our traditions by Aquinas and al-Ghazali). It is important to remember the famous words of Pascal in his “Pensées”:

“The God of Christians is not a God who is simply the author of mathematical truths, or of the order of the elements; that is the view of heathens and Epicureans... But the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob, the God of Christians, is a God of love and of comfort, a God who fills the soul and heart of those whom He possesses, a God who makes them conscious of their inward wretchedness, and His infinite mercy, who unites Himself to their inmost soul, who fills it with humility and joy, with confidence and love, who renders them incapable of any other end than Himself”. (10)

In one’s apologetic efforts to make room for theology and religion amidst their contemporary secular “cultured despisers”, one must remember the important stark difference so rightly pointed out by Pascal: “The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, the God of Jacob. Not of the philosophers and intellectuals. Certitude, certitude, feeling, joy, peace!”

If being rational and having a rational God means adopting the God of the philosophers, be it called “Reason” or “Logos”, most Muslim theologians would simply opt to pass! That is why Asha’rite theologians, while always upholding the importance of devout reasoning that is guided by revelation, never accepted the Hellenistic philosophical worship of “Logos” or the “Active Intellect”.

Islam’s devout insistence on the sovereignty of the living God of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Ishmael, Moses, Jesus and Muhammad (peace be upon them all) must not be cheaply turned against it, with unfair accusations of whimsical irrationality! If properly appreciated such devout Muslim insistence can be a real aid to Christian affirmations of the divine in the face of the atheistically secular.

Let us help each other by overcoming our false “contrast tables”, and by praying for peace and guidance from the One beloved God of all.

God truly knows best!